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at the individual level, but engaging instead in collective risk-
taking strategies. In this paper we look for evidence of such
behaviors in the run-up to the global financial crisis. We find
strong and robust evidence of peer effects in banks’ liquid-
ity risk management. This suggests that incentives for collec-
tive risk-taking play a role in banks’ choices, thus calling for a
macroprudential approach to liquidity regulation.
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1. Introduction
Banks create liquidity in an economy, funding illiquid assets (such
as loans) with liquid liabilities (such as deposits), as discussed by
Berger and Bouwman (2009) and Bouwman (2014). This basic inter-
mediation role of banks relies on a maturity mismatch between assets
and liabilities, making them exposed to bank runs or, more generally,
to funding liquidity risk. There is a vast and prominent theoretical
literature on this problem. Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) provide the pillars for the analysis of banks’ liquidity risk
and bank runs, while other important contributions include Allen
and Gale (2004a, 2004b), Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Diamond and
Rajan (2000, 2001a, and 2001b), Klein (1971), Ratnovski (2009),
and Wagner (2007a). However, there is surprisingly scarce empirical
evidence on banks’ maturity mismatches and funding liquidity risk.
In this paper, we contribute to fill this gap by empirically ana-
lyzing the way banks manage their liquidity risk. More specifically,
we analyze the determinants of banks’ liquidity risk management
choices, explicitly considering potential strategic interactions among
banks. This issue has important policy implications, as banks may
have incentives to engage in collective risk-taking strategies when
there is a strong belief that a (collective) bailout is possible (Acharya,
Mehran, and Thakor 2016; Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007; Farhi
and Tirole 2012). When other banks are taking more risk, a given
bank may be encouraged to pursue similar strategies if its man-
agers believe they will likely be rescued in case of distress. These
collective risk-taking strategies may be optimal from an individual
perspective, as they should allow banks to increase profitability with-
out increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy, due to the explicit or
implicit commitment of the lender of last resort. Hence, these risk-
taking strategies may be mutually reinforcing in some circumstances.
This collective behavior transforms a traditionally microprudential
dimension of banking risk into a macroprudential risk, which may
ultimately generate much larger costs to the economy.
However, it is important to note that the empirical estimation of
these peer effects among banks raises some econometric challenges.
As discussed by Manski (1993), the identification of endogenous and
exogenous effects is undermined by the reflection problem associated
with the reverse causality of peer effects. In other words, if we argue
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that peers’ choices may affect the decisions of a specific bank, we
cannot rule out that the decisions of that bank will not, in turn,
affect the choices made by peers.
In our setting, the best solution available to this critical identifi-
cation problem relies on the use of instrument variables, which have
to be orthogonal to systematic or herding effects. Given the identi-
fication challenges associated with peer effects estimation (Angrist
2014), we rely on two main approaches. First, we use as an instru-
ment for the peer effects the predicted values of liquidity indicators
of peer banks based on regressions analyzing the determinants of
liquidity indicators. In this setting, the predicted values depend on
observable characteristics of the banks in the peer group. In other
words, the predicted value of the liquidity indicators of peer banks
should not directly affect the liquidity indicators of bank i at time
t, as these predicted values are based solely on observable bank
characteristics. By controlling also for country-year fixed effects, we
are able to orthogonalize all country-specific time-varying shocks,
such as changes in macroeconomic and financial conditions, as well
as changes in the regulatory environment. Second, we consider the
approach suggested by Leary and Roberts (2014). These authors
identify the role of peer effects in corporate finance decisions using
the idiosyncratic component of peer firms’ equity returns. Given that
this idiosyncratic component is entirely firm specific, it affects only
the decisions of each firm individually, thereby satisfying the neces-
sary exclusion restrictions for identification. However, this identifi-
cation scheme allows us to consider only publicly listed banks, which
account for less than 30 percent of the sample, being mostly U.S.
banks (92 percent). In both approaches, the benchmark peer group
is the banks operating in the same country in each year, as these are
the banks that are more likely to share common beliefs about the
likelihood of being bailed out by their common lender of last resort.
We obtain strong and consistent evidence of collective risk-taking
behaviors in liquidity risk management. We are aware that to per-
fectly estimate the magnitude of peer effects we would need a fully
experimental setting, which is not available when studying banks’
behavior. Thus, to further minimize the perils of peer effects esti-
mation (Angrist 2014), we run exhaustive robustness tests, includ-
ing the use of alternative identification strategies and other peer
group definitions. Our main results remain valid, supporting the
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existence of significant peer effects between banks in their liquidity
risk management strategies.
Having established the existence of peer effects, it is important
to dig deeper and understand where these strategic interactions are
coming from. Are peer effects stronger for some groups of banks?
Are there leaders and followers in this strategic game? We find that
collective risk-taking strategies are much weaker for small banks, as
well as for the very large banks. The core of strategic interactions
in liquidity risk management is concentrated in large banks that
are just below the threshold of being too big to fail. These results
are entirely consistent with the theoretical predictions of Farhi and
Tirole (2012) and Ratnovski (2009). Smaller banks will hardly ever
be bailed out. In contrast, the largest banks expect to be bailed out
in almost any circumstance. However, large banks just below this
threshold might expect to be bailed out if the stability of the whole
financial system or the economy is at stake. This would be the case
if systemic risk and contagion fears are heightened. By correlating
their decisions and adopting collective risk-taking strategies, these
banks thus increase the likelihood of being bailed out.
Our results have valuable policy implications: liquidity risk is
usually regulated from a microprudential perspective, but our results
show that a macroprudential approach to the regulation of systemic
liquidity risk should not be disregarded. Given this, even though
the new Basel III package on liquidity risk is a huge step forward
in the regulation of liquidity risk, additional macroprudential policy
tools may need to be considered, as the new regulation is still dom-
inantly microprudential. For instance, macroprudential authorities
may consider imposing tighter liquidity regulation or limits to cer-
tain types of exposure, in order to mitigate contagion and systemic
risks, thereby providing the correct incentives to minimize negative
externalities.
The contribution of our paper is manyfold. Even though the
theoretical literature provides many relevant insights and testable
hypotheses regarding banks’ liquidity risk, there is scarce empiri-
cal evidence on banks’ liquidity risk management. Furthermore, we
focus on a period of particular importance, as there is an extensive
discussion regarding excessive risk-taking in the years preceding the
global financial crisis. We provide detailed empirical evidence on the
determinants of liquidity risk, and more importantly, we extend the
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analysis by focusing on strategic interactions. Further, we make an
effort to provide a correct and rigorous econometric treatment for
the endogeneity of peer effects in a multivariate setting. Finally, our
results provide important insights for policymakers, most notably
regarding the macroprudential regulation of systemic liquidity risk.
This paper is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing the
expanding literature on bank’s funding liquidity risk and its reg-
ulation, in section 2. In section 3 we discuss several indicators of
banks’ liquidity risk and characterize the data set used for the empir-
ical analysis, including an overview of banks’ liquidity and funding
choices in the run-up to the recent global financial crisis. In section
4 we analyze how banks manage their liquidity risk, and in section
5 we address the most important question in our paper: do banks
take into account peers’ liquidity strategies when making their own
choices on liquidity risk management? In section 6 we summarize
our main findings and discuss their policy implications.
2. Related Literature
In recent years banks have become increasingly complex institutions
through their exposure to an intertwined set of risks. Traditionally,
most bank loans would be funded with customer deposits. These
liquid claims allow consumers to intertemporally optimize their con-
sumption preferences, but leave banks exposed to the risk of bank
runs, as shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Over time, banks
gained access to a more diversified set of liabilities to fund their
lending activities (Strahan 2008), thus being exposed not only to
traditional runs from depositors but also to the drying up of funds
in wholesale markets, as discussed by Borio (2010) and Huang and
Ratnovski (2011).
The 2008 global financial crisis placed liquidity risk in the
spotlight and made it clear that something was missing in the
international regulatory consensus (Bouwman 2014, Vives 2014).
While banks voluntarily hold buffers of liquid assets to manage
the risks associated with the maturity gap between assets and lia-
bilities (Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor 2016; Acharya, Shin, and
Yorulmazer 2011; Allen and Gale 2004a, 2004b; Bouwman 2014;
Calomiris, Heider, and Hoerova 2013; Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski
2009; Feinman 1993; Gale and Yorulmazer 2013; Rochet and Vives
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2004; Tirole 2011; and Vives 2014), these buffers will hardly ever be
sufficient to fully insure against a bank run or a sudden dry-up in
wholesale markets.
Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b) show that liquidity risk regulation
is necessary when financial markets are incomplete, though empha-
sizing that all interventions inevitably create distortions. Further-
more, Rochet (2004) argues that banks take excessive risk if they
anticipate that there is a high likelihood of being bailed out in case
of distress. Regulation may mitigate this behavior (Acharya, Shin,
and Yorulmazer 2011; Brunnermeier et al. 2009; Cao and Illing 2010;
Gale and Yorulmazer 2013; Holmstrom and Tirole 1998; and Tirole
2011).1
When regulation fails to preemptively address risks, the inter-
vention of the lender of last resort might be necessary. However, the
lender of last resort has an intrinsic moral hazard problem (see, for
example, Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet 2004, Gorton and Huang 2004,
Ratnovski 2009, Rochet and Tirole 1996, Rochet and Vives 2004,
and Wagner 2007a). This mechanism has to be credible ex ante to
prevent crises. But if the mechanism is in fact credible, banks will
know they will be helped out if they face severe difficulties, thus
having perverse incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking behav-
iors (Ratnovski 2009). Repullo (2005) shows that the existence of
a lender of last resort does not lead to risk-taking in banks’ illiq-
uid portfolios (i.e., their lending activities), but it reduces banks’
incentives to hold liquid assets, thereby aggravating liquidity risk.
The moral hazard problem associated with the existence of a
safety net provided by a lender of last resort is further aggravated
1Many authors discuss the importance of imposing minimum holdings of liquid
assets (Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer 2011; Allen and Gale 2004a, 2004b; Farhi,
Golosov, and Tsyvinski 2009; Gale and Yorulmazer 2013; Ratnovski 2009, 2013;
Rochet and Vives 2004; Santos and Suarez 2018; Tirole 2011; and Vives 2014).
However, Wagner (2007b) shows that, paradoxically, holding more liquid assets
may induce more risk-taking by banks. Freixas, Martin, and Skeie (2011) show
that central banks can manage interest rates to induce banks to hold liquid assets,
i.e., monetary policy can help to promote financial stability. In turn, Bengui
(2010) finds arguments to support a tax on short-term debt, whereas Cao and
Illing (2011) show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for banks ex ante
is a crucial requirement for sensible lender of last resort policies. Finally, Diamond
and Rajan (2005) and Wagner (2007a) focus on ex post interventions.
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by systemic behavior.2 Indeed, when most banks are taking exces-
sive risks, each bank manager has clear incentives to herd, instead
of leaning against the wind. Ratnovski (2009) argues that, in equi-
librium, banks have incentives to herd in risk management, choosing
sub-optimal liquidity as long as other banks are expected to do the
same. These collective risk-taking strategies may be optimal from
an individual perspective, as they should allow banks to increase
profitability without increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy, due
to the explicit or implicit bailout commitment of the lender of last
resort. Ratnovski (2009) thus identifies strategic complementarities
between banks in their liquidity risk decisions. Banks will choose to
be more exposed to liquidity risk when other banks do so, as this
increases the likelihood of a systemic liquidity crisis and an ensuing
bailout. Comparative statistics derived from the model show that
this is more likely to happen when banks have lower charter values
or expect shocks that may decrease that value, such as in the run-up
to a crisis.
Some of these arguments are discussed in detail by Farhi and
Tirole (2012), who argue that when banks simultaneously increase
their liquidity risk, through larger maturity mismatches, current
and future social costs are being created. In the presence of strate-
gic complementarities between banks’ maturity transformation deci-
sions, central banks are forced to intervene as lenders of last resort.
This not only creates social costs at the moment of intervention
but also helps to change beliefs and sows the seeds for the next cri-
sis. Given all these market failures, regulation is needed to ensure
that these externalities are considered by banks in their liquidity
risk management. In their model, optimal regulation is associated
with the imposition of a liquidity requirement or an equivalent limit
on short-term debt. Nevertheless, the costs and distortions gener-
ated by such regulation also need to be taken into account. The
model suggests that regulation should be applied only to a sub-
set of key institutions, which would be more likely to be bailed out.
2Citigroup’s former CEO, Charles Prince, has been repeatedly quoted as say-
ing before August 2007 that “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things
will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and
dance. We’re still dancing.”
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However, the market failure behind regulation is not linked to a too-
big-to-fail problem, but rather to a too-correlated-to-fail problem, as
banks adopt excessive maturity mismatches together with correlated
risks.
Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor (2015) and Acharya and Yorul-
mazer (2007) also discuss bailouts when there are many potentially
correlated failures. Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2011) consider
the effect of the business cycle on banks’ optimal liquidity choices
and prove that during upturns banks’ choice of liquid assets jointly
decreases. In turn, Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012) show that when
banks make similar portfolio decisions, systemic risk increases, as
defaults become more correlated. Jain and Gupta (1987) find (weak)
evidence on bank herding during a crisis period. Brown and Dinç
(2011) provide evidence that governments are more likely to bail out
a bank when the whole banking system is in distress, using a sam-
ple of banks from twenty-one emerging markets in the 1990s. Per-
otti and Suarez (2002) prove the existence of strategic interactions
between banks, though their results support the existence of strate-
gic substitutions rather than strategic complementarities. They show
that if banks expect to obtain larger rents if their competitors fail,
their speculative lending decisions are strategic substitutes. Col-
lective risk-taking incentives and strategic complementarities are
also discussed by Acharya (2009), Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008),
Barron and Valev (2000), Boot (2011), Malherbe (2014), Rajan
(2006), Tirole (2011), van den End and Tabbae (2012), and Vives
(2014).
This emerging evidence on systemic liquidity risk calls for ade-
quate macroprudential instruments that address the sources of such
risks, as discussed by Boot (2011), Cao and Illing (2010), and
Farhi and Tirole (2012). Nevertheless, most of these conclusions
are supported by theoretical results, lacking empirical support. Our
paper helps to fill this gap in the literature, by providing empiri-
cal evidence of collective risk-taking in liquidity risk management,
anchored essentially on the theoretical findings of Farhi and Tirole
(2012) and Ratnovski (2009) on strategic complementarities.
Silva (2017) also documents peer effects in liquidity risk, though
our papers differ in several dimensions. While Silva (2017) makes
an effort to understand if the estimated peer effects have effects on
overall financial stability, we focus on understanding where these
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peer effects come from, by exploring interactions between different
groups of banks.3
3. How to Measure Liquidity Risk?
The maturity transformation role of banks generates funding liquid-
ity risk (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). As banks’ liabilities usually
have shorter maturities than those of banks’ assets, banks have to
repeatedly refinance their assets. In the run-up to the global finan-
cial crisis, many banks were engaging in funding strategies that relied
heavily on short-term funding (Brunnermeier 2009; Committee on
the Global Financial System 2010), thereby significantly increasing
their exposure to funding liquidity risk.
In this section we describe the data used and briefly review sev-
eral ways to measure funding liquidity risk, which will later be used
in our empirical analysis.
3.1 Data
Given that one of our objectives is to assess the extent to which
banks take each others’ choices into account when managing liquid-
ity risk, we must consider a sufficiently heterogeneous group of
banks. With that in mind, we collect data from Bankscope for
the period between 2002 and 2009, thus covering both crisis and
pre-crisis years. We collect data on European and North American
banks, selecting only commercial banks and bank holding compa-
nies for which consolidated statements are available in universal
3There are at least two other important differences between the papers. First,
we consider that peer effects are mainly driven by common beliefs about the
possible intervention of a lender of last resort (Ratnovski 2009). As such, we con-
sider that our empirical strategy to deal with the estimation of peer effects is
more adequate for the purpose of our study than that used in Silva (2017), in
which a foreign parent bank holding group influences the decisions of its domes-
tic subsidiary, thus generating partially overlapping peer groups. Second, Silva
(2017) uses data up to 2014, while our analysis is based on data up to only 2009.
We believe that extending the sample for the 2010–14 period might bias the esti-
mation of peer effects, as the Basel Committee issued its first guidelines on the
new liquidity regulation that would be part of Basel III in 2010 (Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision 2010). We should thus expect that banks began to
change their liquidity ratios in the same direction simultaneously in reaction to
the new Basel rules, which could lead to an over-estimation of peer effects.
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Table 1. Banks’ Characteristics
N Mean Min. P25 P50 P75 Max.
Total Assets 17,620 21,200 92 295 659 2,183 772,000
Total Capital Ratio 10,211 14.5 7.3 11.3 12.9 15.6 44.5
Tier 1 Ratio 9,851 12.6 4.7 9.5 11.2 13.9 41.6
Net Interest Margin 17,561 3.7 0.3 3.0 3.8 4.4 10.4
Return on Assets 17,596 0.9 −4.9 0.5 1.0 1.3 5.1
Cost to Income 17,510 67.1 27.4 56.7 65.0 74.2 165.1
Net Loans to Total Assets 17,509 63.0 5.1 55.1 66.4 75.2 90.6
Notes: Total assets are in millions of USD. The total capital and tier 1 ratios are cal-
culated according to the regulatory rules defined by the Basel Committee. Net interest
margin is defined as net interest income as a percentage of earning assets. Return on
assets is computed as net income as a percentage of average assets. The cost-to-income
ratio is computed as banks’ operational costs (overheads) as a percentage of income gen-
erated before provisions. These variables are included in the Bankscope database. The
statistics presented refer to data after outliers were winsorized.
format, so as to ensure the comparability of variables across coun-
tries. Savings and investment banks are not included in the data
set, as they usually have different liquidity risk profiles and funding
strategies. Using these filters, we obtain data for almost 3,500 banks
during eight years, for forty-five countries.4 Excluding banks without
information on total assets, we obtain 17,643 bank-year observations.
In table 1 we summarize the major characteristics of the banks
included in the sample.
3.2 Liquidity Indicators
In table 2 we present summary statistics on liquidity risk for
the banks included in the sample. As discussed by Tirole (2011),
4These countries are Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova Republic, Mon-
tenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation,
San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. In Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Liechtenstein, Moldova Republic, Montenegro, and San Marino there are fewer
than ten observations for the entire sample period. Given this, we exclude these
six countries from all cross-country analysis.
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Table 2. Liquidity Indicators: Summary Statistics
A. Global Summary Statistics
N Mean Min. P25 P50 P75 Max.
Liquidity Creation 17,620 9.1 −35.7 −4.8 4.8 22.1 69.2
NSFR 17,618 115.1 27.8 106.7 121.2 129.9 155.1
B. Liquidity Indicators Over Time (Mean)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Liquidity Creation 2.7 2.5 3.8 6.9 13.0 13.7 13.9 24.9 9.1
NSFR 122.2 122.6 119.9 116.9 109.4 108.5 108.2 104.5 115.1
Notes: Liquidity creation is a proxy of the liquidity indicator proposed by Berger and
Bouwman (2009). The higher this variable is, the more liquidity a bank is creating, i.e.,
the larger is its maturity transformation role. NSFR is an approximation of the net sta-
ble funding ratio defined in Basel III, which considers the available stable funding as a
percentage of the required stable funding (i.e., assets that need to be funded). These two
variables are negatively correlated (i.e., more liquidity risk is associated with higher liquid-
ity creation and lower NSFR) and are defined in detail in the data appendix. The statistics
presented refer to data after outliers were winsorized.
liquidity cannot be measured by relying on a single variable or ratio,
given its complexity and the multitude of potential risk sources. Ide-
ally, a complete liquidity indicator would rely on the overall liquidity
mismatch between assets and liabilities. However, the data necessary
for such an indicator is usually not publicly available. Nevertheless,
some approximation is feasible. Taking that into account, we focus
our analysis on two indicators that offer an encompassing view of
banks’ liquidity risk: (i) liquidity creation and (ii) net stable funding
ratio.
Liquidity creation as a percentage of total assets is a proxy of the
liquidity indicator proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009). These
authors define liquidity creation as
Liquidity creation
= {1/2 ∗ Illiq assets + 0 ∗ Semi liq assets − 1/2 ∗ Liq assets}
+ {1/2 ∗ Liq liabilities + 0 ∗ Semi liq liab. − 1/2 ∗ Illiq liab.}
− 1/2 ∗ Capital.
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Figure 1. Liquidity Indicators Over Time (Mean)
The higher this variable is, the more liquidity a bank is creating,
i.e., the larger is its maturity transformation role. More liquidity is
created when illiquid assets are transformed into liquid liabilities. Of
course, liquidity creation is positively related with funding liquidity
risk, given that banks that create more liquidity have fewer liquid
assets to meet short-term funding pressures.5
Liquidity creation increased steadily during the sample period,
including during the crisis years (figure 1). Actually, its highest value
was recorded in 2009, thus showing that banks continued to create
liquidity even during the global financial crisis. However, this also
implies that liquidity risk increased during this period, according to
this indicator. However, it is important to note that this indicator
continued to increase during the crisis because banks’ total assets
contracted more than liquidity creation itself.
Figure 2 shows that this variable exhibits some dispersion during
our sample period.
In turn, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) included in the
Basel III package is a structural ratio designed to address liquidity
5Berger and Bouwman (2009) consider two different measures of liquidity cre-
ation. Besides the one presented above, there is another definition that considers
off-balance-sheet data. Though the latter definition is more encompassing, cap-
turing better the liquidity created by a bank, the data available in Bankscope
do not allow us to compute it for our sample. Please see the data appendix for
further details.
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Figure 2. Empirical Distribution of the Liquidity
Creation Ratio
Notes: Liquidity creation is a proxy of the liquidity indicator proposed by Berger
and Bouwman (2009). The higher this variable is, the more liquidity a bank is
creating, i.e., the larger is its maturity transformation role. See the data appendix
for further details.
mismatches and to encourage an increased reliance on medium- and
long-term funding, thus increasing the average maturity of banks’
liabilities. The NSFR is the ratio between the available and the
required amount of stable funding, which should be at least 100
percent. The higher this ratio is, the more comfortable is the insti-
tution’s liquidity position. Though the available data do not allow for
the accurate computation of this indicator, a rough approximation
is possible.6
The NSFR showed some deterioration in the run-up to the cri-
sis. Figure 3 shows that most banks record high values in this ratio.
It is important to stress that this indicator is an approximation
of the indicator proposed by the Basel Committee. As such, the
100 percent minimum threshold defined for this ratio for prudential
purposes cannot be considered for our indicator.
6Please see the data appendix for further details.
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Figure 3. Empirical Distribution of the NSFR
Notes: NSFR is an approximation of the net stable funding ratio defined in Basel
III, which considers the available stable funding as a percentage of the required
stable funding (i.e., assets that need to be funded). See the data appendix for
further details.
The two liquidity indicators used in our analysis offer an encom-
passing view of banks’ liquidity risk because they contain informa-
tion from all assets and liabilities.
Our main research question is to understand if collective strate-
gies played a role in these developments. But before we address this
question, in the next section we will provide some insight on which
factors are relevant to explain the heterogeneity in liquidity indica-
tors. This analysis is relevant given the lack of empirical evidence on
the determinants of liquidity risk. Only after having clarified that
will we be able to understand how peer effects work over and above
the individual determinants of liquidity indicators.
4. How Do Banks Manage Liquidity Risk?
Even though liquidity risk management is one of the most impor-
tant decisions in the prudent management of financial institutions,
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there is scarce empirical evidence on the determinants of liquidity
indicators. Using our data set, we are able to explore which bank
characteristics may be relevant in explaining liquidity indicators. In
table 3 we present some results on the two main liquidity indicators
described in the previous section: (i) liquidity creation (column 1);
and (ii) net stable funding ratio (column 2). All specifications use
robust standard errors, bank fixed effects, and country-year fixed
effects, such that
Liqxit = α0 + αi + αnt + β1Capitalit−1 + β2Banksizeit
+ β3Profitabilityit−1 + β4Cost incit−1
+ β5Lend specit−1 + β6(Liq − xit−1) + it + εit, (1)
where Liqxit is the liquidity indicator analyzed, α0 is a constant,
αi is the bank fixed effect, αnt is the country-year fixed effect, it is
the year fixed effect, and εit is the estimation residual. Bank fixed
effects allow us to control for all time-invariant bank characteris-
tics, while country-year fixed effects control for all country-specific
time-varying shocks, such as changes in macroeconomic and financial
conditions, or changes in the regulatory environment. By controlling
also for time fixed effects, we are able to orthogonalize all systematic
and common shocks to banks.
As explanatory variables, we use a set of core bank indica-
tors on solvency, size, profitability, efficiency, and specialization.
Capitalit is the total capital ratio calculated according to the rules
defined by the Basel Committee. Pierret (2015) shows that there
are important interactions between liquidity risk and banks’ sol-
vency. Banks face higher refinancing risk if markets question their
solvency in a crisis. Based on this, we could expect that banks
with lower capital ratios have more prudent liquidity risk manage-
ment policies. Indeed, de Haan and van den End (2013) find that
there is a negative relationship between capital ratios and liquidity
buffers of Dutch banks. However, Bonner, van Lelyveld, and Zymek
(2015) and Dinger (2009) obtain the opposite result using data
from banks in multiple countries. This might reflect the fact that
some banks engage in overall more prudent risk management strate-
gies, holding larger capital and liquidity buffers, while others do the
opposite.
116 International Journal of Central Banking June 2019
Table 3. Determinants of Liquidity Indicators
Dependent Variable → Liquidity
Creation NSFR
(1) (2)
Total Capital Ratiot–1 −0.14 0.07
(−1.56) (0.85)
Log Assetst −5.87∗∗∗ −2.69∗∗
(−4.96) (−2.46)
Net Interest Margint–1 −1.37∗∗∗ 2.11∗∗∗
(−3.96) (5.95)




Net Loans to Total Assetst–1 0.29∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(6.72) (2.03)
Loans to Customer Depositst–1 −0.02∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(−2.01) (−5.77)
Liquidity Ratiot–1 0.23∗∗∗ 0.04
(7.90) (1.36)
















Number of Observations 7,020 7,020
Number of Banks 1,738 1,738
R2 Within 0.366 0.160
R2 Between 0.139 0.165
R2 Overall 0.103 0.138
Fraction of Variance Due to Bank FE 0.998 0.984
Notes: All regressions include country-year fixed effects, bank fixed effects, and robust standard
errors. t-statistics are in parentheses. The total capital ratio is calculated according to the regu-
latory rules defined by the Basel Committee. Net interest margin is defined as net interest income
as a percentage of earning assets. Return on assets is computed as net income as a percentage of
average assets. The cost-to-income ratio is computed as banks’ operational costs (overheads) as
a percentage of income generated before provisions. Liquidity creation is a proxy of the liquidity
indicator proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009). The higher this variable is, the more liquidity
a bank is creating, i.e., the larger is its maturity transformation role. NSFR is an approximation of
the net stable funding ratio defined in Basel III, which considers the available stable funding as a
percentage of the required stable funding (i.e., assets that need to be funded). These two variables
are negatively correlated (i.e., more liquidity risk is associated with higher liquidity creation and
lower NSFR) and are defined in detail in the data appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Banksizeit is measured by the log of assets. Larger banks might
show poorer liquidity indicators for two reasons. First, larger banks
can more easily have access to markets and might thus afford to
hold less liquid assets. Second, larger banks are often perceived as
too big to fail, thus having fewer incentives to have very prudent
(and costlier) liquidity risk management strategies. Indeed, Dinger
(2009) and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) find that larger banks
hold fewer liquid assets, though Aspachs, Nier, and Tisset (2005)
find no significant effects for U.K. banks.
Profitabilityit is proxied by the return on assets and the net
interest margin. On the one hand, more-profitable banks may allo-
cate part of their cash flows to holdings of liquid assets. On the other
hand, these banks may be confident in their ability to continue to
generate cash flows, thus holding fewer liquidity buffers. Indeed, the
results in the literature are mixed. Bonner, van Lelyveld, and Zymek
(2015) find that there is a positive relationship between profitability
and liquidity holdings, while Deléchat et al. (2012) find a negative
effect, and Aspachs, Nier, and Tisset (2005) do not find significant
effects.
Cost incit refers to the cost-to-income ratio, which is a proxy
for cost-efficiency. Banks’ liquidity risk management policies might
also be related with their operational efficiency. However, as for
profitability, the sign of this relationship is uncertain.
Finally, lend specit measures the extent to which a bank is spe-
cialized in lending, by considering net loans as a percentage of total
assets. We include this variable to control for banks’ business mod-
els. Banks that are specialized in lending have a more traditional
intermediation profile. This may mean that they also have more
conservative risk management practices. Alternatively, given that
loans are an illiquid asset, they may hold proportionally fewer liquid
assets than a more diversified bank.
(Liq−xit) refers to the other liquidity indicators, i.e., xit = −xit.
Given that liquidity risk is hard to capture using one single indica-
tor, as discussed above, we consider that it is important to control
for the other liquidity indicators, as they jointly characterize the risk
profile of each institution.
All variables are lagged by one period to mitigate concerns of
simultaneity and reverse causality.
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Even though some relationship between capital and liquidity
could be expected (Berger and Bouwman 2009, Diamond and Rajan
2000, 2001b), the total capital ratio is not statistically significant in
any of the specifications tested.
The results on bank size are mixed. While larger banks create
less liquidity (column 1), thereby showing less liquidity risk, they
have lower NSFRs (column 2), thus being riskier in this dimension.
The relationship between profitability and liquidity risk is rather
mixed. On the one hand, when banks obtain larger net interest
margins, they seem to display lower liquidity risk, when measured
both by liquidity creation and NSFR. On the other hand, when
banks record higher overall profitability, as measured by return on
assets, they show more liquidity risk (more liquidity creation and
less-stable funding structures). Banks that are more profitable in
their basic intermediation function seem to have less risky funding
structures, while banks that are broadly more profitable (possibly
obtaining larger gains from other income sources) tend to be riskier
in their liquidity risk management. These are possibly banks that
adopt riskier strategies in order to boost profitability, thus being
more vulnerable to funding liquidity risk. This result is in line with
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), who show that banks that
rely on strategies based on non-interest income and on short-term
funding are significantly riskier.
In turn, when banks become more efficient, with lower cost-to-
income ratios, they create, on average, less liquidity and have larger
net stable funding ratios.
The relationship between liquidity risk and bank specialization
is different depending on the liquidity indicator used. On the one
hand, banks that become more specialized in lending to customers
tend to create more liquidity. On the other hand, these banks show
more stable funding structures.
Finally, it is worth noting that much of the variation in liquid-
ity ratios cannot be attributable to the observed financial ratios.
Indeed, as shown in table 3, bank fixed effects account for a very
large fraction of the variance. This result is entirely consistent with
evidence obtained by Gropp and Heider (2010) regarding the deter-
minants of banks’ capital ratios. These authors find that unobserved
time-invariant bank fixed effects are ultimately the most important
determinant of banks’ capital ratios.
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5. Are Other Banks’ Decisions Relevant?
In the previous section we shed some light on the role of dif-
ferent bank characteristics in their observed liquidity strategies.
However, it is possible to argue that banks do not optimize their
liquidity choices strictly individually and may take into account
other banks’ choices. In fact, when banks believe that they may
be bailed out in case of severe financial distress (for being too big,
too systemic, or too interconnected to fail), they may actually have
incentives to herd, engaging in similar risk-taking and management
strategies.
In this section we seek evidence of possible herding behavior of
banks in liquidity risk management, especially in the years before
the global financial crisis. The identification and measurement of
peer effects on individual choices is a challenging econometric prob-
lem, as discussed by Manski (1993). In section 5.1 we briefly discuss
these identification problems, in section 5.2 we propose an empirical
strategy to address these concerns, and in section 5.3 we present our
main results. To mitigate the perils of peer effect estimation (Angrist
2014), we perform an extensive robustness analysis including using
alternative identification strategies and running estimations for sub-
sets of countries, banks, and time periods. We also consider other
peer group definitions, as this issue is critical for identification. For
instance, we consider the role of strategic interactions between large
and small banks, and also test whether small banks follow the strate-
gies of large banks.
5.1 The Reflection Problem and Identification Strategies
In a multivariate setting, the impact of peers’ liquidity indicators on
a bank’s liquidity decisions could be estimated through the following
adapted version of equation (1):






+ β2Banksizeit + β3Profitabilityit−1 + β4Cost incit−1
+ β5Lend specit−1 + β6(Liq − xit−1) + it + εit, (2)





Nit−1 represents the average liquidity indicators of peers
and all the other variables and parameters are defined as in equa-
tion (1). In the baseline specification, the peer banks are all the other
banks operating in the same country, which share common beliefs
about the lender of last resort. The coefficient β0 captures the extent
to which banks’ liquidity choices reflect those of the peer group.
Recall that we are controlling for bank, time, and country-year fixed
effects.
However, this estimation entails some econometric problems: as
we argue that peer choices may affect the decisions of a specific
bank, we cannot rule out that the decisions of that bank will not,
in turn, affect the choices made by peers. This reverse causality
problem in peer effects is usually referred to as the reflection prob-
lem. This problem was initially described by Manski (1993), who
distinguishes three different dimensions of peer effects: (i) endoge-
nous effects, (ii) exogenous or contextual effects, and (iii) correlated
effects. Endogenous effects arise from the influence of peer outcomes
and are what we usually think of as “pure” peer effects. In our
case, this is directly related to observed liquidity decisions. Banks
choose their liquidity risk management strategies taking into account
the choices made by other banks. Exogenous or contextual effects
are related with the influence of exogenous peer characteristics. For
instance, if other banks are making higher profits, bank i may engage
in risk-taking strategies to increase its profitability. This may be
achieved by assuming less prudent liquidity risk management strate-
gies. In this case, the peer effect is not so directly linked to the
outcome variable. When we control for banks’ time-varying charac-
teristics we try to mitigate this concern. Finally, there are correlated
effects, which affect all elements of a peer group simultaneously. For
instance, changes in monetary policy, macroeconomic conditions, or
bailout expectations may lead to simultaneous changes in banks’
liquidity strategies. We are able to control these using time fixed
effects and country-year fixed effects.
Empirically, it is very challenging to disentangle these three
effects. More specifically, Manski (1993) discusses the difficulties
arising from the distinction between effective peer effects (either
endogenous or exogenous) from other correlated effects. Further-
more, the identification of endogenous and exogenous effects is
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undermined by this reflection problem, as the simultaneity in peers’
decisions should result in a perfect collinearity between the expected
mean outcome of the group and its mean characteristics, as dis-
cussed also by Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) and Carrell,
Fullerton, and West (2009).
This discussion makes clear that the estimation of equation (2)
may not allow for the accurate estimation of peer effects. Our solu-
tion to this important identification problem relies on the use of
instrumental variables to address this endogeneity problem. Manski
(2000) argues that the reflection problem can be solved if there is
an instrumental variable that directly affects the outcomes of some,
but not all, members of the peer group.7 As discussed in Brown et
al. (2008) and Leary and Roberts (2014), such an instrument must
be orthogonal to systematic or herding effects. We considered two
different approaches.
First, we use as instruments the predicted values of liquidity
indicators of peer banks based on the regressions of the determi-
nants of liquidity indicators presented in table 3. The predicted val-
ues depend on the characteristics of the banks in the peer group,
excluding bank i. To ensure that the instrument is valid, the pre-
dicted values of peer banks should be highly correlated with the
average of the observed liquidity indicators, our potentially endoge-
nous variable. More importantly, for the exclusion restriction to hold,
the predicted values should be orthogonal to systematic or herding
effects. In other words, the predicted value of the liquidity indicators
of peer banks should not directly affect Liqxit, the liquidity indica-
tor of bank i at time t, as these predicted values are based solely on
observable bank characteristics.
Given that the instrumental variable is a linear combination of
observed bank characteristics, we believe that the exclusion restric-
tion holds. The coefficients sustaining this linear combination come
from a regression in which we explore the role of bank characteris-
tics in explaining liquidity ratios. A bank with a given amount of
7Other solutions to the reflection problem found in the literature are, for exam-
ple, having randomly assigned peer groups (Sacerdote 2001), having variations in
group sizes (Lee 2007), or identifying social networks using spatial econometrics
techniques (Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009). Given the characteristics of
peer groups in our sample, none of these solutions can be applied in our setting.
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capital, with a given return on assets, etc., is expected to have a cer-
tain liquidity ratio. This should not be contaminated by the effect
of peer choices.
Importantly, as we control also for time effects, we are able to
orthogonalize all systematic shocks to banks. In addition, we con-
trol for country-year fixed effects, in order to consider the effect of
time-varying country characteristics that may simultaneously affect
all banks in a given country. As such, the estimated peer effects are
orthogonal to time-varying common factors that affect all banks in
each country.
Formally, our instrumental-variables approach is equivalent to
the estimation of
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Nit−1 , i.e., the average liquidity indicators


















+ β1Capitaljt−1 + β2Banksizejt
+ β3Profitabilityjt−1 + β4Cost incjt−1
+ β5Lend specjt−1 + β6(Liq − xjt−1) + it + εit.
(4)
The predicted values Liq predxjt are obtained from a bank-level
equation in which we consider the entire set of bank characteristics:
Liq predxit = α0 + αi + αnt + β1Capitalit−1 + β2Banksizeit
+ β3Profitabilityit−1 + β4Cost incit−1
+ β5Lend specit−1 + β6(Liq − xit−1) + it. (5)
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Second, we consider an entirely different instrument based on the
empirical strategy followed by Leary and Roberts (2014). To identify
peer effects in corporate financial policy, these authors looked for an
instrument that would not directly affect the financing decisions of a
given firm, but that would influence those of the peer group of firms.
An instrument that fulfills these exclusion and relevance conditions
is the idiosyncratic component of peer firms’ equity returns. We fol-
low a similar approach, by computing bank-specific equity returns
as the difference between the bank’s returns and those of the S&P
banks index in a given year.8
As before, we define the benchmark peer group as the banks
operating in the same country and in the same year. These are the
banks that are more likely to engage in collective risk-taking behav-
iors due to implicit or explicit bailout expectations. Let us suppose
that in a given country several banks engage in funding liquidity
strategies that are deemed as overall risky (e.g., excessive reliance
on short-term debt to finance long-term assets, large funding gaps,
or persistent tapping of interbank markets). If several banks engage
8This approach is simpler than that used by Leary and Roberts (2014), who
estimate idiosyncratic returns using an augmented factor model such that
Rijt = αijt + βMijt(RMt − RFt) + βSMBijt (SMBt) + βHMLijt (HMLt)
+ βMOMijt (MOMt) + β
IND
ijt (Rjt − RFt) + ηijt,
where Rijt refers to the total return for firm i in industry j over month t. The first
four factors are those commonly used in empirical asset pricing studies (Fama
and French 1993). The fifth factor is the excess return on an equally weighted
industry portfolio. This augmented model is justified by the fact that in their
paper peer effects are being estimated at the industry level, while our paper
focuses on only the banking sector. We simplified our approach even further for
two main reasons. First, in these regressions we are dealing with a relatively small
number of banks (around 400), thus raising issues about the definitions of the
small minus big portfolio return (SMB), of the high minus low portfolio return
(HML), and of the momentum portfolio return (MOM). Furthermore, adapting
these definitions for a sample of international banks is not trivial and would
require significant assumptions. The alternative of using the regular factors cali-
brated for U.S. non-financial firms does not seem entirely reasonable, and it might
bias the results in uncertain directions. Finally, Schuermann and Stiroh (2006)
show that the market factor plays a central role in explaining bank returns when
compared with the Fama-French factors. Taking all these factors into account,
we considered that it would be more prudent to use a one-factor model in the
estimation of idiosyncratic returns, while still respecting the intuition behind the
instrumental-variables approach used by Leary and Roberts (2014).
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in these strategies simultaneously, there is naturally an increase in
systemic risk. As discussed by Ratnovski (2009) and Rochet and
Tirole (1996), a lender of last resort is not necessarily going to bail
out one bank that gets into trouble because of its own idiosyncratic
wrong choices (unless this bank is clearly too big or too systemic to
fail). However, if several banks are at risk, the lender of last resort
needs to take the necessary actions to contain systemic risk. In this
case, the likelihood of a bailout should increase, as if one of these
banks gets into trouble, other banks will likely follow very soon, thus
becoming too many to fail (Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007). Given
this incentive structure, a given bank in that country clearly has
high incentives to engage in similar risky but profitable strategies.
However, the same cannot be said for a bank operating in another
country, where there is a different lender of last resort. This reason-
ing justifies our choice for the reference peer group. Nevertheless, we
will later relax this restriction and test other possible peer groups.
Using the two approaches, we are able to identify peer effects,
after having dealt with the reflection problem through the use of
instrumental variables. However, given that identification hinges on
the quality of the instrument, we considered alternative approaches,
discussed in detail in section 5.2.2. These include using another
instrument inspired by the social multiplier approach proposed by
Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Sacerdote (2003) and Sacerdote (2011).
5.2 Empirical Results
Table 4 presents the results of the first instrumental-variable
approach in the estimation of peer effects in liquidity risk
management.
In the first two columns we present the results of the estimation
of equation (2). Hence, in these columns the peer effects are included
in the regressions without properly addressing the reflection problem
discussed before. When running this simple, yet possibly biased, esti-
mation, we find strong evidence of positive peer or herding effects in
individual banks’ choices for the two liquidity indicators. The riskier
are the funding and liquidity strategies of other banks in a given
country, the riskier will tend to be the choices of each bank individ-
ually. However, as discussed above, these preliminary estimates may








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Vol. 15 No. 2 Liquidity Risk and Collective Moral Hazard 127
not be dealing adequately with the endogeneity problem underlying
the estimation of peer effects.
The second group of columns (3–4) displays our main empirical
results when explicitly dealing with the endogeneity problem cre-
ated by considering peer effects. When we use the predicted values
of peers’ liquidity indicators as instruments, we conclude that the
results presented in the first columns are no longer significant for the
NSFR. For liquidity creation, peer effects continue to be strongly sta-
tistically significant. We obtain a coefficient of 0.56, meaning that
one standard deviation in the average liquidity creation of peer banks
will increase the liquidity creation of a given bank by 0.56 stan-
dard deviations. The different results obtained when the endogeneity
problem is addressed are an indication that neglecting endogeneity
in peer effects may lead to biased and incorrect results.
As discussed above, a good instrument should have an important
contribution in explaining the potentially endogenous variable—i.e.,
the average peers’ liquidity choices—but it should not directly affect
the dependent variable. In the previous subsection we discussed why
the latter condition holds in our setting, whereas in the last group of
columns of table 4 we show that the chosen instrument is strongly
statistically significant in both regressions.
Table 5 shows the results using our second identification strat-
egy, based on Leary and Roberts (2014). Even though the subsample
of listed banks used to compute this alternative estimation of peer
effects is much smaller than the original (roughly one-quarter), we
are still able to obtain statistically significant peer effects. In this
case, the results are significant not only for liquidity creation but
also for the NSFR. However, the statistical significance of the results
is weaker. In terms of economic significance, the peer effects coming
from the NSFR are very similar to those obtained from liquidity
creation in table 4 (0.59, compared to 0.56 in table 4). However, the
magnitude of the peer effects for liquidity creation is much larger
with this identification strategy (1.28). Nevertheless, it is important
to note that this coefficient is more imprecisely estimated, due to
the lower statistical significance.9
9The sample used in table 5 is much smaller than that used in table 4. The
difference in the significance and magnitude of peer effects between these two
tables could thus be due to the difference in the way peer effects are measured
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5.2.1 Who Follows Whom: Alternative Peer Group Definitions
One key issue in the analysis of peer effects is the definition of an
appropriate peer group (Manski 2000). So far we have assumed that
the relevant peer group for collective risk-taking behaviors are the
other banks in the same country. This hypothesis is anchored in
the theoretical framework of Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Ratnovski
(2009), which guides our analysis. Given that banks operating in
the same country share the same lender of last resort, we argue
that they likely share common beliefs about the likelihood of being
bailed out in case of heightened systemic risk. However, it is possi-
ble that bailout probabilities are not the same for all banks in the
same country. Actually, Farhi and Tirole (2012) show that this is
true and argue that regulation should be applied only to a subset of
key institutions that benefit from these implicit support guarantees,
thus having incentives to take excessive risk.
To address these concerns, in table 6 we test alternative peer
group definitions, in order to gain more insights about where collec-
tive risk-taking behaviors are coming from.
The first very simple exercise is to explore time dynamics within
our baseline peer group definition. Until now we have assumed that
banks make their decisions contemporaneously. However, it is pos-
sible that there are dynamic and lagged effects that are not being
captured when using this definition. To check that, we run our esti-
mations using lagged peer effects. The results obtained are very
similar, suggesting that there is some persistency in banks’ strategic
interactions.
An additional possibility is to consider that banks focus on peer
groups outside borders, implying that the lender of last resort may
not be the only factor motivating excessive risk-taking in liquid-
ity management. For example, large international players may fol-
low similar strategies because they are competing to achieve higher
returns on equity, possibly through riskier funding and liquidity
strategies. To test this additional hypothesis, we consider as peers
or to the different sample used. To clarify this issue, we estimated our baseline
peer effect estimation (table 4) using the sample of listed firms used for the esti-
mation of the results reported in table 5. The results using this smaller sample
are broadly consistent with those of table 4, thus suggesting that the differences
in the results come mainly from identification strategy used rather than from the
decrease in sample size.
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Table 6. Regressions on Peer Effects in Liquidity
Strategies—Robustness on Peer Group Definition
Bank Peer Effects: Bank Peer Effects
Country-Year Peer (with IV): Second-
Group (without IV) Step Regressions
Liquidity Liquidity
Creation NSFR Creation NSFR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Peer Effects 0.81∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.36
(18.62) (7.54) (9.02) (1.08)
Lagged Peers
Peer Effects 0.38∗∗∗ 0.03 0.74∗∗∗ 0.79
(5.83) (0.65) (6.00) (0.67)
Peers as Other Banks (in Other
Countries) in the Same Quartile
Peer Effects 0.82∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.30 −0.11
(9.50) (3.59) (1.22) (−0.39)
Large Banks (Fourth Quartile in
Each Country)
Peer Effects 0.40∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.10 0.35∗∗∗
(5.97) (4.40) (0.33) (5.05)
Large Banks (Fourth Quartile in the
Sample)
Peer Effects 0.30∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 1.60∗ 0.21∗
(4.83) (4.12) (1.67) (1.69)
Only Larger Banks (Third and
Fourth Quartiles)
Peer Effects 0.63∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(10.45) (7.38) (6.64) (2.46)
Only Smaller Banks (First and
Second Quartiles)
Peer Effects 0.75∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗ 0.16
(12.19) (4.14) (1.98) (1.50)
Only Larger Banks (Top Five in
Each Country)
Peer Effects 0.15∗ 0.17∗∗ −0.04 0.26
(1.78) (2.27) (−0.12) (1.27)
Only Larger Banks (Banks Classified
as SIFIs)
Peer Effects −0.03 0.21 −0.27 0.48
(−0.14) (1.11) (−0.52) (1.27)
Only Larger Banks (Banks that
Belong to the EURIBOR Panel)
Peer Effects 0.46∗∗ 0.17∗ −0.37 0.38∗
(2.55) (1.70) (−0.38) (1.87)
(continued)
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Table 6. (Continued)
Bank Peer Effects: Bank Peer Effects
Country-Year Peer (with IV): Second-
Group (without IV) Step Regressions
Liquidity Liquidity
Creation NSFR Creation NSFR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excluding Larger Banks (Top Five
in Each Country)
Peer Effects 0.76∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ −0.55
(14.15) (6.40) (9.01) (−0.81)
Small Banks Following Large
Banks (Fourth Quartile)
Peer Effects 0.59∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.41∗∗ −0.15∗∗
(7.41) (−0.24) (−2.35) (−2.15)
Small Banks Following Large
Banks (Top Five)
Peer Effects −0.84∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −1.38∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(−9.66) (−7.13) (−4.33) (−5.71)
Small Banks Following Large
Banks (SIFI List)
Peer Effects −0.47∗∗∗ 0.00 −1.84∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(−5.82) (−0.01) (−14.06) (3.42)
Small Banks Following Large
Banks (EURIBOR Panel)
Peer Effects −0.21∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.86∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗
(−3.41) (−0.51) (−9.77) (−4.92)
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. Each line shows the coefficients for peer effects
for different robustness tests. Bank quartiles were defined based on banks’ total assets.
Top five refers to the banks classified as being in the top five by assets in each country
in Bankscope. The list of SIFIs (systemically important financial institutions) is the one
disclosed by the Financial Stability Board in 2011. Columns 1 and 2 show the results
obtained when peer liquidity choices are considered directly in the regressions, i.e., not
addressing the reflection problem. Columns 3 and 4 show the results of the instrumental-
variables regressions, where the instruments are the predicted values of peers’ liquidity
ratios. These predicted values result from the estimation of the regressions in table 3. All
the regressions use the same control variables as those reported in table 5. All regressions
include year, country-year, and bank fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.
all the other banks of the same size quartile, regardless of their coun-
try of origin. This seems to be implausible, as peer effects are not
statistically significant in any of the indicators analyzed. Collective
risk-taking strategies seem to play a role mainly at the national level,
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possibly reflecting common lender of last resort beliefs previously
discussed.
Another possibility is that the lender of last resort may only be
willing to support banks that are too big or too systemic to fail, even
if several banks are taking risks at the same time. Hence, it is pos-
sible that herding incentives are stronger for larger banks. To test
this, we run our regressions only for the largest banks in the sample,
defined as those in the fourth quartile of the total assets distribution
in each country. When we use instrumental variables for the identifi-
cation of peer effects, we continue to obtain evidence supporting the
existence of collective risk-taking strategies. However, the results are
now significant only for the NSFR.
A bank that is very large within borders may be a small bank in
international terms. This should be especially true in smaller coun-
tries, with smaller banking systems. We might argue that large inter-
nationally active banks could also act as a peer group. To take that
into account, we estimate the same regressions for the largest banks,
but now defined as those in the fourth quartile of the worldwide
total assets distribution. We still find evidence of peer effects, but
remarkably weaker, thus providing further evidence that collective
risk-taking is important mainly within borders.
To further examine the role of peer effects among larger banks,
we compare peer effects estimates for banks above the median with
those below. The statistical significance of peer effects is more robust
for the largest banks, though there is also significant evidence of
herding among the smaller banks. However, when only the five
largest banks in each country are considered, the results on peer
effects vanish entirely. Taking all this together, peer effects seem to
be more prevalent among large banks, though not the largest ones.
Estimating peer effects for only the smallest banks also allows us
to exclude large internationally active banks from the sample. These
banks may have complex liquidity risk management strategies, with
cross-border implications. As we still obtain statistically significant
peer effects for these smaller banks, we can be confident that our
results are not being influenced by these large international players
having sophisticated risk management and hedging tools.
Even though the pre-crisis debate on systemic risk focused essen-
tially on bank size, the global financial crisis made it clear that
a small or medium-sized institution can also be systemic if, for
instance, it is too interconnected to fail. Given this, size may be
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an imperfect measure of systemic risk. Indeed, the Basel Commit-
tee considers that systemically important banks should be identified
using five different sets of indicators, taking into account (i) cross-
jurisdictional activity, (ii) size, (iii) interconnectedness, (iv) substi-
tutability, and (v) complexity.10 Each set of indicators has an equal
weight of 20 percent. That said, size is only one of the dimensions
that allows identifying a systemically important institution. How-
ever, the other four dimensions rely on a set of indicators that are
generally not publicly available. Against this background, we also
considered the list of systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs) disclosed by the Financial Stability Board, in order to test
whether there are significant peer effects within this group of banks.
The results for these very large institutions are also weaker than for
the initial large banks definition. In addition, we also considered the
set of banks that belong to the EURIBOR panel, which may be seen
as an alternative list of systemic financial institutions. In this case,
the results are marginally significant only for the NSFR.
In sum, when we consider stricter definitions of large banks, such
as banks that are classified among the top five in each country, banks
belonging to the systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs)
list disclosed by the Financial Stability Board, or banks in the EURI-
BOR panel, the results are relatively weaker. This is not surpris-
ing, as these are the banks that have fewer incentives to engage
in collective risk-taking strategies. Indeed, these very large banks
are generally too big to fail, benefiting permanently from implicit
bailout guarantees. As such, these banks are the ones that face lower
incentives to engage in riskier strategies when other banks are doing
so, given that their probability of being bailed out hardly changes.
Indeed, when we exclude the top five banks from the estimation, the
results remain virtually unchanged, thus showing that herd behavior
is not dominated by the largest banks.
Given these results, another important dimension to test is
whether small banks tend to replicate the behavior of the larger
banks. These smaller banks are those that could benefit more from
engaging in collective risk-taking strategies, as argued above, most
notably when larger banks are already taking more risk, thereby
increasing the likelihood of systemic distress (Dávila and Walther
10http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.pdf.
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2017). Using different definitions of small and large banks, we obtain
evidence of significant peer effects. However, in contrast to what we
could expect initially, we obtain negative peer effects in some spec-
ifications for liquidity creation and for the NSFR in most specifica-
tions. This means that, in these cases, small banks actually decrease
liquidity risk when the largest banks are increasing it. Collective risk-
taking strategies are not prevalent among the smaller banks. These
banks do not seem to replicate liquidity risk management strategies
between themselves, nor replicate those of the largest banks.
Summing up what we have learned so far from considering differ-
ent definitions of peer groups and peer interactions based on bank
size and systemic importance, we can claim that peer effects are
stronger for larger banks, though not for the largest of them all. This
is consistent with the view that the largest banks are too big to fail
and expect to be bailed out in any circumstance. In turn, smaller
banks will hardly ever be bailed out. However, relatively large banks,
just below the top ones, might expect to be bailed out in exceptional
circumstances. This would be the case if systemic risk and contagion
fears are heightened. In such a scenario, the likelihood of a bailout
in case of distress might increase, as the responsible authorities will
be worried about mitigating contagion. This creates incentives for
banks to engage in collective risk-taking strategies. If every player
adopts similar strategies, it will be hard to single out one institu-
tion for excessive risk-taking, thus making a bailout more justifiable
(Farhi and Tirole 2012; Ratnovski 2009).
5.2.2 Robustness Analysis
To better understand how these peer effects work and to ensure that
the results are consistent under a wide set of specifications, we run
a large battery of robustness tests.
Table 7 reports some of the most important tests conducted.
All the estimations were performed without and with instrumental
variables, in columns 1–2 and 3–4, respectively.
Given the challenges of peer effects estimation (Angrist 2014;
Manski 1993, 2000), we begin by testing alternative identification
strategies.
First, we consider an adapted version of our identification strat-
egy based on the social multiplier proposed by Glaeser, Scheinkman,
and Sacerdote (2003) and Sacerdote (2011). The basic idea is to
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Table 7. Regressions on Peer Effects in Liquidity
Strategies—Robustness
Bank Peer Effects: Bank Peer Effects
Country-Year Peer (with IV): Second-
Group (without IV) Step Regressions
Liquidity Liquidity
Creation NSFR Creation NSFR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Peer Effects 0.81∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.36
(18.62) (7.54) (9.02) (1.08)
Peer Effects Using Predicted
Values (without IV)





Peer Effects 0.81∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.34
(17.13) (7.62) (4.74) (0.81)
Before the Crisis
Peer Effects 0.46∗∗∗ 0.12 0.35∗∗∗ 0.33∗
(5.24) (1.54) (2.74) (1.94)
Removing Banks with Asset
Growth above 50 Percent
Peer Effects 0.79∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(17.94) (7.00) (7.97) (2.60)
Excluding U.S. Banks
Peer Effects 0.24∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ −1.87 0.28∗
(2.92) (2.94) (−1.47) (1.95)
Excluding Smaller Countries
(Less than Fifty Observations)
Peer Effects 0.84∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.25
(18.78) (7.06) (10.60) (1.06)
Western Europe Banks
Peer Effects 0.24∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ −10.43 0.24
(2.45) (2.79) (−0.42) (0.43)
Eastern Europe Banks
Peer Effects 0.20 0.13 0.28 0.25∗
(1.59) (1.22) (0.26) (1.73)
U.S., Canada, and Western
Europe Banks
Peer Effects 0.79∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.23
(13.12) (6.60) (8.78) (1.47)
Excluding Countries More Directly
Affected during the Global Crisis
Peer Effects 0.21∗∗ 0.15∗∗ −1.35 0.18
(2.41) (2.06) (−1.48) (1.18)
(continued)
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Table 7. (Continued)
Bank Peer Effects: Bank Peer Effects
Country-Year Peer (with IV): Second-
Group (without IV) Step Regressions
Liquidity Liquidity
Creation NSFR Creation NSFR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Euro Area as One Peer Group
Peer Effects 0.85∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 4.00
(18.87) (7.49) (10.47) (0.68)
Without Country-Year Fixed Effects
Peer Effects 0.81∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.36
(18.62) (7.54) (3.46) (1.08)
With Country and Year Fixed
Effects (Random-Effects
Estimation)
Peer Effects 0.78∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.02
(19.34) (6.95) (5.21) (0.11)
Without Liquidity Controls
Peer Effects 0.81∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.25
(19.91) (6.90) (8.58) (0.44)
Controlling for Leverage (instead of
Capital Ratio)
Peer Effects 0.76∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(21.44) (9.97) (16.09) (3.50)
Only after 2004
Peer Effects 0.89∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(20.90) (9.01) (6.41) (2.31)
Lagged Dependent Variables
Peer Effects 0.76∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.00
(18.14) (7.90) (8.87) (0.00)
Peers Weighted by Size
Peer Effects 0.82∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.27
(18.04) (7.41) (4.33) (0.81)
Notes: Peers are defined as the j = i banks operating in the same country and in the
same year as bank i. t-statistics are in parentheses. Each line shows the coefficients for peer
effects for different robustness tests. In the regressions with bootstrapped standard errors,
two year dummies had to be excluded. The pre-crisis period refers to the years 2002–
06. Countries considered as most directly affected by the global financial crisis include
the United States, Iceland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Columns 1 and 2
show the results obtained when peer liquidity choices are considered directly in the regres-
sions, i.e., not addressing the reflection problem. Columns 3 and 4 show the results of
the instrumental-variables regressions, where the instruments are the predicted values of
peers’ liquidity ratios. These predicted values result from the estimation of the regressions
in table 3. All the regressions use the same control variables as those reported in table 5.
All regressions include year, country-year, and bank fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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use the peer group average of the predicted values arising from
the regressions on liquidity determinants directly in the peer effects
regressions (equation (1)), instead of using them as instruments for
the peer effects.11 The results of this alternative estimation approach
confirm the existence of peer effects, though only for liquidity
creation.
A potentially relevant econometric issue is related with the use
of predicted regressors in the estimations. To be sure that this is
not affecting the results, we present the results using bootstrapped
standard errors.12 The results are generally consistent.
For robustness, we exclude the crisis period in order to focus the
analysis on possible peer effects in the years before the global finan-
cial crisis. The peer effect coefficient for liquidity creation remains
significant, while for the NSFR we now have marginally significant
results when using instrumental variables. This shows that collective
risk-taking behaviors were more prevalent before the crisis.
In addition, we remove from the sample banks with year-on-
year asset growth above 50 percent, as these banks may have been
involved in mergers and acquisitions. Our results become signifi-
cantly stronger in this case, most notably for the NSFR.
U.S. banks represent slightly more than three-quarters of the
sample. In order to ensure that the results are not influenced by
this, we exclude all U.S. banks from the estimation. In this case, we
obtain statistically significant effects only for the NSFR. In addition,
we also estimate the regressions separately for Western and Eastern
European banks, and for U.S., Canadian, and Western European
banks together. The results are not statistically significant when only
Western European banks are considered and are marginally signif-
icant for Eastern European banks. All this suggests that collective
11Our estimates of the social multiplier are an adaptation because of the level
of aggregation considered. As discussed by Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Sacerdote
(2003), several levels of aggregation may be considered in the estimations of the
social multiplier. In our case, we use the coefficients from an individual-level
regression to predict aggregate-level outcomes for the peer group of each bank.
We then regress observed individual outcomes on these aggregate predicted values
to obtain the social multiplier.
12The estimated coefficients display minor differences because it was necessary
to exclude two year dummies from the estimations, in order to obtain the degrees
of freedom necessary for the bootstrapping.
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risk-taking strategies in the run-up to the crisis were more prevalent
among U.S. banks.
Furthermore, we exclude the countries more directly affected by
the global financial crisis from the regressions (United States, Ice-
land, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy). When banks from
these countries are excluded, we obtain no evidence for collective
risk-taking strategies, suggesting that the countries more severely
hit by the crisis were indeed those where these behaviors were more
prevalent.
Given the strong financial integration in the euro area, we also
tested whether banks operating in euro-area countries behave as a
peer group. The results are consistent with the baseline specifica-
tion, showing that it is indifferent considering euro-area members
individually or as a single group. When all banks in our sample are
considered, we obtain statistically significant peer effects on liquidity
creation regardless of whether we consider euro-area banks as one
single peer group or as separate country-level peer groups.
For robustness purposes, we also run our estimates without using
country-year fixed effects, with separate country and year fixed
effects (using random-effects estimation), and without controlling
for liquidity indicators. In all cases the results are robust.
In our baseline specification we used the total capital ratio as
an explanatory variable. However, the global financial crisis showed
that, in many cases, the leverage ratio was better able to capture
the financial situation of banks. To address this issue we estimated
the peer effect regressions using the leverage ratio (measured as
equity over total assets) instead of the total capital ratio. The results
are stronger, as the peer effects on the NSFR become statistically
significant and increase for liquidity creation.
We also consider data only from 2004 on, in order to avoid
using accounting information that is time inconsistent, given that
in many countries common accounting reporting standards (IFRS)
were introduced around this time. The results become generally
stronger.
Finally, we estimated the models including a lagged dependent
variable and weighting peers by their size. The results are qualita-
tively and quantitatively consistent in both cases.
All in all, the robustness analysis points to consistent evidence
of significant peer effects in liquidity risk decisions.
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Table 8. Peer Effects by Year
Bank Peer Effects: Bank Peer Effects:
Country-Year Peer Group Country-Year Peer Group
(IV = Predicted Values (IV = Idiosyncratic Equity
of Rivals’ Liquidity Ratios) Returns) Second-Step
Second-Step Regressions Regressions
Liquidity Liquidity
Creation NSFR Creation NSFR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample 0.56∗∗∗ 0.36 1.28∗ 0.59∗∗
(9.02) (1.08) (1.70) (2.00)
2003 0.52∗∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.61 −5.54
(8.44) (1.92) (1.60) (−0.35)
2004 0.38∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗ −3.75 −2.36∗
(4.89) (2.04) (−0.59) (−1.77)
2005 0.51∗∗∗ 0.03 1.51 0.34
(6.49) (0.44) (0.74) (0.37)
2006 0.68∗∗∗ −0.04 0.80 3.08
(12.93) (−0.94) (1.01) (0.30)
2007 0.74∗∗∗ −0.08∗ 0.28 0.43∗∗
(14.01) (−1.66) (0.85) (2.51)
2008 0.76∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.10 0.38
(14.18) (2.02) (−0.29) (1.28)
2009 0.13 0.21∗∗∗ −3.49 0.73∗∗∗
(1.25) (3.69) (−0.87) (3.42)
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. Each line shows the coefficients for peer effects for
different years. All the regressions use the same control variables as those reported in table
4. All regressions include year, country-year, and bank fixed effects. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.
5.2.3 Peer Effects by Year
In section 3.2, we looked into the evolution and dispersion of liquid-
ity indicators in the run-up to the global financial crisis, observing
that there was a general deterioration in liquidity indicators during
this period. In this subsection, we estimate peer effects for each year.
The results are in table 8.
In terms of statistical significance, when we consider as instru-
ments the predicted values of liquidity indicators (columns 1 and
2), there were peer effects in almost all years in liquidity creation,
with the exception of 2009. The results are somewhat weaker for the
Vol. 15 No. 2 Liquidity Risk and Collective Moral Hazard 141
NSFR. When we use the idiosyncratic component of equity returns
as an instrument as in Leary and Roberts (2014), thereby focus-
ing on a smaller subsample of publicly listed banks, the results are
slightly weaker, though there is still statistically significant evidence
of peer effects in the NSFR (columns 3 and 4).
Looking at the economic significance of the estimated peer
effects, some interesting conclusions may be drawn. Peer effects were
greater in the years immediately before the global financial crisis. For
instance, in 2007 the peer effects estimated for liquidity creation were
0.74, which compares with an average estimate for the whole sample
of 0.56. This suggests that there were indeed observable collective
risk-taking behaviors right before the global financial crisis, which
possibly made banks more vulnerable to the shocks they later faced.
It is also interesting to note that there were significant peer effects
during the crisis years, when banks were simultaneously reshaping
their balance sheets to manage risks in the new environment in which
they were operating, marked by heightened funding pressures and
deleveraging incentives.
6. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
Banks’ liquidity risk was at the core of the global financial crisis in its
early days. By transforming liquid liabilities (deposits) into illiquid
claims (loans), banks are intrinsically exposed to funding liquidity
risk, though this risk materializes only occasionally. In this paper we
provide empirical insight into how banks manage their liquidity risk
and consider explicitly the role of collective risk-taking strategies on
herding behavior. Indeed, when other banks are taking more risk,
any given bank may have incentives to engage in similar strategies.
The empirical estimation of these peer effects among banks in
such a framework raises some econometric challenges. Based on the
arguments put forth by Manski (1993), if we consider that peer
choices may affect the decisions of a specific bank, we cannot rule
out that the decisions of that bank will not, in turn, affect the
choices made by peers (reflection problem). To overcome this critical
identification problem, we use two strategies based on instrumen-
tal variables. First, we consider as an instrument for peer effects
the predicted values of liquidity indicators of peer banks based on
the regressions of the determinants of liquidity indicators. These
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predicted values depend only on observable bank characteristics and
should thus be orthogonal to systematic or herding effects. Second,
we follow an empirical strategy based on Leary and Roberts (2014),
using the idiosyncratic component of equity returns as an instrument
for peer effects.
Using these two methodologies, we can find evidence of signifi-
cant peer effects, which is strengthened by extensive robustness tests.
Peer effects are stronger for larger banks, though not for the largest
ones. The latter are typically perceived as being too big to fail and
probably do not need to change their behavior when other banks
are taking more risk. The smallest banks will hardly ever be bailed
out. So, strategic interactions are stronger for large banks below
the top tier, which do not expect to be bailed out under normal
circumstances but may be so in a situation of heightened systemic
risk, when a large bank failure could lead to a collapse in the finan-
cial system. These results lend empirical support to the theoretical
findings of Farhi and Tirole (2012) and Ratnovski (2009).
Our results provide an important contribution to the ongoing
policy debate. These collective risk-taking behaviors call for reg-
ulation to adequately align the incentives and minimize negative
externalities. The collective behavior of banks transforms a tradi-
tionally microprudential dimension of banking risk into a macropru-
dential risk, which may ultimately generate much larger costs to the
economy.
The Basel III regulatory framework is a huge step forward in the
international regulation of banks. At the microprudential level, new
liquidity requirements are going to be gradually imposed, reduc-
ing excessive maturity mismatches and ensuring that banks hold
enough liquid assets to survive during a short stress period. How-
ever, our results suggest that there may be an element missing from
the new regulatory framework: the systemic component of liquidity
risk. The new liquidity risk regulation will ensure that, at the micro-
prudential level, institutions are less exposed to liquidity risk. Nev-
ertheless, additional macroprudential policy tools may eventually be
considered to mitigate the incentives for collective risk-taking
strategies. These may include tighter (cyclical or sectoral) liquidity
regulation or limits to certain types of exposures or funding sources.
Moreover, a well-functioning resolution and bail-in framework is
critical to mitigate bailout expectations.
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Data Appendix




Residential Mortgage Loans SL 0 0.65
Other Mortgage Loans SL 0 0.65
Other Consumer/Retail Loans SL 0 0.85
Corporate and Commercial 1 0.5 0.85
Loans
Other Loans 1 0.5 0.85
Less: Reserves for Impaired −1.00
Loans/NPLs
Net Loans
Loans and Advances to Banks SL 0 0.50
Reverse Repos and Cash 0.00
Collateral
Trading Securities and at FV 0.50
through Income
Derivatives 0.50
Available for Sale Securities 0.50
Held to Maturity Securities 1.00
At-Equity Investments in 1.00
Associates
Other Securities 1.00
Total Securities L −0.5
Investments in Property 1 0.5 1.00
Insurance Assets 1 0.5 1.00
Other Earning Assets 1 0.5 1.00
Total Earning Assets
Cash and Due from Banks L −0.5 0.00
Foreclosed Real Estate 1 0.5 1.00
Fixed Assets 1 0.5 1.00
Goodwill 1 0.5 1.00
Other Intangibles 1 0.5 1.00
Current Tax Assets 1 0.5 1.00
Deferred Tax Assets 1 0.5 1.00
Discontinued Operations 1 0.5 1.00
Other Assets 1 0.5 1.00
Total Assets
Liabilities
Customer Deposits: Current L 0.5
Customer Deposits: Savings L 0.5
Customer Deposits: Term SL 0
Total Customer Deposits 0.85
Deposits from Banks L 0.5 0.00
Repos and Cash Collateral L 0.5 0.00
Other Deposits and Short- L 0.5 0.00
Term Borrowings
(continued)




Total Deposits, Money Market
and Short-Term Funding
Total Long-Term Funding 1 −0.5 1.00
Derivatives L 0.5 0.00
Trading Liabilities L 0.5 0.00
Total Funding
Fair Value Portion of Debt SL 0.0 0.00
Credit Impairment Reserves SL 0.0 0.00
Reserves for Pensions and Other SL 0.0 0.00
Current Tax Liabilities SL 0.0 0.00
Deferred Tax Liabilities SL 0.0 0.00
Other Deferred Liabilities SL 0.0 0.00
Discontinued Operations SL 0.0 0.00
Insurance Liabilities SL 0.0 0.00
Other Liabilities SL 0.0 0.00
Total Liabilities
Pref. Shares and Hybrid 1 −0.5 1.00
Capital Accounted for as Debt
Pref. Shares and Hybrid 1 −0.5 1.00
Capital Accounted for as
Equity
Total Equity 1 −0.5 1.00
Total Liabilities and Equity
Notes: Liquidity creation is a proxy of the liquidity indicator proposed by Berger and
Bouwman (2009). The higher this variable is, the more liquidity a bank is creating, i.e.,
the larger is its maturity transformation role. The variable is defined as
Liquidity creation = {1/2 ∗ Illiq assets + 0 ∗ Semi liq assets − 1/2 ∗ Liq assets}
+ {1/2 ∗ Liq liab. + 0 ∗ Semi liq liab. − 1/2 ∗ Illiq liab.} − 1/2 ∗ Capital.
Assets and liabilities are classified as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid based on the criteria
used by Berger and Bouwman (2009). The classification for each accounting item is dis-
played in the table. Some assumptions were made, as the accounting classification is not
identical to the one used in Berger and Bouwman (2009). We consider liquidity creation
as a percentage of total assets.
NSFR is an approximation of the net stable funding ratio defined in Basel III, which
considers the available stable funding relative to the required stable funding (i.e., assets
that need to be funded). The higher this ratio is, the more comfortable is the institution’s





Each accounting item was given a weight based on the Basel Committee’s guidelines. How-
ever, it is important to note that this is a rough approximation, as the accounting data
available on Bankscope do not allow for accurate classification of all the items. The weights
chosen are presented in the table.
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